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COMMENT
COMPUTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE
ITERATIVE TEST
Carl Sundholm
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological progress and economic expansion in the com-
puter field are directly related to the effectiveness of copyright law
in protecting and rewarding innovation. High technology busi-
nesses frequently spend vast amounts of capital in the research and
development of computer software products.1 The time, effort and
money invested in program development is, in turn, recovered
through the licensing or sales of software products.2 However,
software pirates have found a faster and less expensive method of
making money in this field.
Software pirates are individuals who take a newly developed
program and simply restructure or slightly modify it. By circum-
venting the more costly research and development process, they can
afford to underprice a competitor who rightfully owns that pro-
gram.3 The prevalence of intellectual property thievery threatens to
Copyright © 1987 Carl Sundholm. All Rights Reserved.
1. For instance, the total investment in software in the United States has been esti-
mated to exceed 200 billion dollars. D. BENDER, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION
(1984).
2. For example, IBM's 1980 revenues for separately licensed software exceeded 1 bil-
lion dollars. Program packaging or "bundling" of software programs with popular hardware
is another way of recouping costs by adequate sales. As long as the "tying" is by technology
rather than by contract, the antitrust laws are generally not violated under the holding and
reasoning of Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied. 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985), reh. den. 106 S. Ct. 18 (1985). See the discussion in Note, Per
Se Unlawful Tying Arrangements Under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts: Sufficient
Economic Power in the Tying Product to Appreciably Restrain Competition in the Tied Product
Market Found to Exist, 2 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 195 (1986). How-
ever, technological tying may ultimately require sound technological reasons for an adequate
antitrust defense. See Hershman, Technological Ties, 3 COMPUTER LAW 8 (1986).
3. Piracy of personal computer programs generally has been calculated to drain $500
million in sales from software companies. Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Pro-
grams: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264 (1984).
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undermine the very structure of the computer industry since it eco-
nomically favors the thieves at the expense of the innovative firms.
Because copyright law holds the most promise for software
protection,4 the effectiveness of the courts in applying copyright
Competitive software piracy may take many forms: (1) industrial espionage and theft of
computer chips and programs, (2) leasing or purchasing computer products and "disassem-
bling" the programs to construct illegal copies, and (3) "headhunting" or hiring-away key
employees in the research and development process and having them reconstruct a competi-
tor's end product in a matter of months without the years of costly development. Under-
standably, software developers have become quite concerned with obtaining adequate and
effective forms of technological and legal protection for the fruits of their labor.
4. Copyright law is the most important and useful legal weapon for the protection of
software. Contractual protection of software is generally supplemental to either trade secret
or copyright protection. One form of contractual protection in mass marketed software is
through the so-called "shrink wrap" contracts or "box top" licenses whereby the opening of
the package (or the use of the program) represents an acceptance of an agreement to abide by
the contract provisions, including the "no copying" provisions. For an excellent discussion of
the enforceability of such contracts, see Note, Enforceability of Box-Top Licenses: A Proposal
to End the Dilemma, 2 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 171 (1986). Contrac-
tual protection for software may also appear in the employer-employee context and impose
non-disclosure duties and non-copying obligations.
Patent protection is available for some computer software. See Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972); Paine Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1984); H.
HANNEMAN, PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE (1986); Sumner, et aL, The Versa-
tility of Software Patent Protection, 3 COMPUTER LAW 1 (1986). However, software must
meet certain statutory requirements of novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness; it must not
be a pure mathematical algorithm; it should be intertwined with a concrete process of pro-
duction; and it may qualify if it transforms an object into a new state. The trend is toward
expanding computer patent protection. Though patent protection provides a virtual monop-
oly for 17 years, it involves considerable cost, delay, and requires mandatory disclosure.
Trade secret protection is less costly but limited to the degree that a computer program
is shielded by internal security measures, contractual protections, notification, and confiden-
tial relationships. If the software is sufficiently novel and useful, trade secrecy protects
against the misappropriation of software through "improper means" such as theft, bribery,
and breach of confidential relationship. However, once the secret is disclosed through negli-
gence, publication, or otherwise, the protection is lost, unlike patent or copyright. Trade
secret measures are inexpensive but do not provide the degree of protection accorded by
copyright and patent law.
Copyright therefore appears to provide the most cost-effective means of protection for
computer programs. It has the advantages of patents in continuing protection after disclo-
sure, but registration is quick, inexpensive, and enforcement costs are lower. Also, the scope
of copyright protection is considerably greater. Copyright clearly provides more protection
than trade secrecy in the mass marketing situation where the risk of disclosure is high. More-
over, copyright applies to a wider range of subject matter than does patent protection and
lasts from the time of invention to 50 years beyond the author's lifetime. Increasing recogni-
tion that copyright is the most promising form of protection for computer programs is evi-
denced by the expansion of the scope of copyright protection for computer programs from
the inclusion of "computer programs" in the Copyright Act in the 1980 Amendments of 17
U.S.C. § 101, to the protection of the underlying program in the form of a ROM chip in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), to the
protection of semiconductor chip masks with the Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 900-914 (1984).
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law to safeguard the works of innovators against copying is essential
to the continued economic growth and technological progress of the
computer software industry.
Copyright law protects the expression of an idea, not the idea
itself. When dealing with computer programs, the distinction be-
tween an idea and its expression is often difficult to discern. As a
result, one of the most important aspects of copyright law in this
field is the methodology courts use to determine whether an original
work's "expression" or "idea" has been copied.
The traditional method used by the courts to determine
whether a non-identical work infringes the copyright of another is
the "substantial similarity" test. The substantial similarity test first
evolved in cases dealing with literary and artistic works. However,
when applied to technologically-oriented works, the test has re-
sulted in increasing irregularity and uncertainty. Essentially, the
problem is that there is no single, uniform substantial similarity test
for copyrighted computer subject matter. Lack of a uniform test
has made it difficult to predict whether a court will uphold the
copyright of software designers against pirates.
This comment will address the problem of inconsistency in the
application of the substantial similarity test to computer subject
matter. First, the historical background and development of the
test as applied to traditional subject matter will be reviewed. Sec-
ond, the manner in which the test has changed in response to the
novel copyright issues raised by computer programs and output will
be explored. Third, the existing tests for substantial similarity will
be identified, categorized, and analyzed. Finally, a new "integra-
tive" test will be proposed for determining substantial similarity in
the adjudication of computer copyright infringement actions.
II. INCONSISTENT TESTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
A. Historical Background
Before considering the current situation, it is worthwhile to
survey the historical emergence and development of the substantial
similarity test as applied to traditional subject matter.
The origins of the substantial similarity test are generally
credited to Judge Learned Hand. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.,' the court utilized an "abstractions test" to determine
whether Universal Pictures had misappropriated the expression of
the plaintiff's play "Abie's Irish Rose" in its motion picture "The
5. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Cohens and the Kellys." Both works featured a story line which
reenacted a Romeo and Juliet plot with an Irish-Catholic twist, yet
there were many differences in detail and concept. In formulating
his abstractions test, Judge Hand commented that the question in
this type of case is not the piecemeal appropriation of parts of an-
other's work, but rather the more abstract taking of the overall con-
cept and form of the author's work.6
It is of course essential... that the right cannot be limited liter-
ally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial vari-
ations ..... [H]e may appropriate a part... [and then] the
question is whether the part so taken is "substantial," and there-
fore not a "fair use"... .7Upon any work... a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out .... [B]ut there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise [the author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.8
This substantial similarity test focused on discerning when the simi-
larity between works is due to copying expressions rather than ideas
by establishing the degree of remoteness in terms of abstract simi-
larity. The more detailed the similarity, the greater the likelihood
that a work's expression has been copied. Furthermore, the Nichols
test allowed for the introduction of expert testimony to determine
similarities and differences. However, because such testimony was
extensive and prolonged at the trial, Judge Hand was prompted to
argue against the inclusion of expert testimony in future cases.
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit followed Judge Hand's
6. Once a protectable right and access by the defendant have been proven, the plaintiff
need not establish that the entire work has been copied verbatim to prove infringement. In
copyright law generally, infringement may be proven if there is substantial similarity in one of
two forms: (1) what the late Professor Melville Nimmer has termed "comprehensive non-
literal similarity," where the overall "total concept and feel" has been appropriated by a
paraphrased copy and (2) "fragmented literal similarity," where portions of the plaintiff's
work have been duplicated and incorporated into the defendant's work. 3 M. NIMMER, LAW
OF CopYRiGrHT, § 13.03(A) (1963). Though Nimmer stated at the time he coined the terms,
the distinction had never been used by a court, it is clearly made by Judge Hand in the quote
from the Nichols case which follows in the text.
7. It is questionable whether the "fair use" doctrine applies to computer programs
insofar as their elements do not have the requisite communicative intelligibility to the normal
human being to be "quoted," as the traditional notions of "fair use" implied. However, with
the development of cases like the "Betamax case," Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984), the traditional idea of
"fair use" has been potentially extended to include private, non-commercial uses that do not
economically harm the copyright owner.
8. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir 1930).
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suggestion in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer.f The Lloyd court
stated that substantial similarity should be determined from the
standpoint of an "ordinary observer," excluding expert testimony
and analysis of the work. Later courts termed this test the "audi-
ence test" or "ordinary observer test." 10
In Arnstein v. PorterI and Sid and Marty Krofft Television Pro-
ductions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 2 the substantial similarity test
was further modified. Arnstein arose from an infringement action
against musician Cole Porter. While the lower court dismissed
plaintiff's case on summary judgment, on appeal Judge Frank re-
versed stating that the determination of copyright infringement was
a question of fact for the jury which should be decided using a two-
step test.
The first step of the test involves a determination of whether
the plaintiff's work was actually used by the defendant in preparing
his work, i.e., whether the work had been copied. This is deter-
mined by a finding of access to plaintiff's work plus discovery of
enough similarities to conclude the work has been copied. The sim-
ilarities are established by using expert testimony and analytic dis-
section' 3 of the elements of each composition.
The second step of the Arnstein test assesses whether the de-
fendant's copying of plaintiff's work is sufficiently detailed to con-
stitute an improper acquisition, i.e., an "illegal" copying. This is
evaluated from the standpoint of the ordinary observer, deliberately
excluding expert testimony and analytic dissection. Under this
standard, if both the copying and improper acquisition tests are sat-
isfied, the plaintiff meets the burden of proving infringement.
The Krofft two-stage test resembles the Arnstein approach and
is the most widely used version of the substantial similarity test.
The Ninth Circuit in Krofft developed an "extrinsic/intrinsic test"
to resolve a claim that the defendant's "McDonaldland" fantasy
characters in commercials infringed the copyright of the plaintiff's
fictional "H.R. Puffn'Stuff" characters.
9. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
10. The actual test in Lloyd involving the "ordinary observer" has been more influential
than the "abstractions test" as first formulated in Nichols.
Also, Howard Root has criticized the audience test as not providing an adequate test for
assessing the copying of computer programs where there typically is no "ordinary audience."
See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial
Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264 (1984).
11. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
12. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. Analytic dissection involves a comparative breakdown and detailed analysis of the
elements of both works, segregating their similarities And differences.
1987]
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The "extrinsic" phase of this test concentrates on whether
there is a substantial similarity in the works which indicates the
copying of ideas. This phase is termed "extrinsic" because the trier
of fact relies exclusively on an analytic dissection of the work,
enumerating specific elements of similarity or difference based upon
expert testimony. The "intrinsic" stage addresses the question of
whether the degree of similarity indicates the copying of the plain-
tiff's expression. During this second phase, as in the Arnstein test,
the focus is on the intrinsic similarity of the works as perceived by
an ordinary reasonable person, without the aid of expert testimony
and analytical dissection.14 Accordingly, both the Arnstein and
Krofft tests first use a point-by-point comparison using expert evi-
dence to resolve the copying issue and then use the ordinary ob-
server test to decide whether the similarity is so substantial as to
amount to illegal infringement.
The foregoing tests represent the fundamental approaches for
adjudicating copyright infringement in cases involving traditional
subject matter. However, the application of these tests to the non-
traditional subject matter of computer output and computer pro-
grams brought about further variations of the substantial similarity
test.
B. Substantial Similarity and Computer Products
1. Similarity Tests and Computer Output
In cases where the disputed issue is the similarity of computer
output rather than the underlying program itself, the subject mat-
ter, with one exception, has been limited to videogames copyrighted
as audiovisual works.' 5 Because there is less of a conceptual differ-
ence between the audiovisual display of a computer program and
the audiovisual aspects of more traditional subject matter such as
plays, artwork, photographs, and movies, computerized audiovisual
presentations are more amenable to traditional similarity tests than
14. Though some writers have suggested the Krofft test modified the Arnstein test,
there are no significant differences. See supra, note 10, at 1279 n. 99.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). Computer products may either be copyrighted as audiovi-
sual works or as literary works. A computer program may be copyrighted in both ways. See
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 1986), for an example of the
situation where one competing party to rights in the same videogame had registered a copy-
right on the audiovisual aspects while another registered the underlying computer program.
Presently, the only non-videogame case is Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986), which involved an audiovisual copyright on screen
menus in a printing program. Many more non-videogame audiovisual copyright cases will
follow as the state of the law moves into a different phase which reflects the growing impor-
tance of personal computers in the American economy.
[Vol. 3
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are the underlying programs. 16 However, there are very significant
differences.
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, the federal court applied
a substantial similarity test to computer-generated audiovisual out-
put for the first time. 7 In this case, a preliminary injunction was
sought against the distributors: of coin-operated videogames to pre-
vent further distribution of infringing copies of three of the plain-
tiff's games: Pac Man, Galaxian, and Rally-X.' 8  The
Dirkschneider court utilized a "striking similarity" test in finding
that the defendant's games were so overwhelmingly similar that ac-
cess could be inferred without any other direct proof.19 A point-
by-point comparison of each game was made without the aid of ex-
pert evaluation. The court found only minor differences between
the works, and each of these differences were so minute that they
would not be noticed unless the games were subjected to a side-by-
side comparison. Although the court cited Krofft, it modified the
Krofft extrinsic/intrinsic test substantially by merging the two
stages and combining the ordinary observer test for expression simi-
larity with the first analytic dissection test for idea similarity. In
view of the trivial differences, the court granted plaintiff a prelimi-
nary injunction.
The next case to apply the test to modem technology, Atari
Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,2° was an action to enjoin the sale of
16. Yet there are problems with computerized video displays too: for instance, the stat-
utory fixation requirement and the problem of repetitive images.
17. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
18. The rights to the coin operated versions of these games were assigned to Midway
from Namco, a Japanese corporation. Pac Man is a maze chase game where the player
guides a "gobbler" figure through a maze while trying to "eat" as many dots as possible and
at the same time avoid being "killed" by "ghost monsters" programmed to chase the gobbler.
Galaxian is an arcade game where the player moves his ship horizontally along the bottom of
the screen to avoid projectiles fired by invading aliens from the top of the screen and at the
same time tries to fire missles at the invaders to slow or stop the invasion. Rally-X is a
combination maze chase and race car game where the object is to race through the maze to
gather as many checkpoint flags as possible before running Zut of gas.
19. "[l]f the similarity between the works is so striking that the possibility of independ-
ent creation is precluded, a court may find that copying occurred without direct proof of
access," 543 F. Supp. 466, 482 (1981) citing Ferguson v. N.B.C. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th
Cir. 1978); Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 202-04 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The burden of proof
is on the plaintiff and it can be a heavy burden to prove that the similarities could only be
explained by copying. Differences considered minor by the court included minor differences
in the text, attract modes, quicker play, differently named characters, and differences in maze
routes.
20. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). Atari's "Asteriods" arcade game is played by a
player commanding a spaceship at the center of the screen and responds to "dangerous"
situations which threaten to bombard the ship, from interplanetary rocks adrift to enemy
spaceships.
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the defendant's game "Meteors" as an allegedly infringing copy of
the plaintiff's game "Asteroids." Employing a Dirkschneider ap-
proach, the court found twenty-two similarities and nine differences
and queried whether these differences would be apparent to the or-
dinary player. Although the differences were minor2" and very sim-
ilar to those involved in Dirkschneider, including speed of play,
movement, coloration, and non-essential textual matter, the Amuse-
ment World court used the same test to arrive at a different and
much-criticized conclusion.22 The court held that an ordinary ob-
server would not find the "overall feel" of the games to be the same
and that the similarities that existed were "inevitable given the re-
quirements of the idea of a game involving a spaceship combating
space rocks and given the technical demands of the medium of a
videogame."23 Based on this finding and on the rationale that
where choice in expression is limited by the idea itself the copy-
righting of one of those expressions should not provide a monopoly
on the idea,24 the court found that no substantial similarity existed
between the games.
In Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd.,25 the plaintiff requested a pre-
liminary injunction against the distribution of defendant's vide-
ogame "War of the Bugs" as an alleged infringing copy of the
plaintiff's game "Centipedes." The court employed a substantial
similarity test based on an analogy to biological taxonomy:
[I]f I were a biologist and the machines were animals, ... and
there was a controversy concerning hominids, I would have to
say that both of these machines were Homo sapiens ... at least
members of the same type or species.
I think I would have to go further... and find that they
belonged to the same family.
I would even have to go further but not as far as counsel for
the plaintiff says - they are not identical twins. In fact, they are
not twins at all, but in my judgment, they are brothers.2 6
In using this test, the court was, in effect, judging substantial simi-
larity by Judge Learned Hand's abstractions test. Unlike Hand's
21. Relating to speed of play, color versus black and white, small differences in shading,
background, and movement, and a minor variation in the introductory sequence.
22. This holding has been criticized in: Note, The Courts Establish the Rules for Vide.
ogames Under the Copyright Act of 1976: Is It Too Hard to Play?, 10 RUTGERS COMp. &
TECH L.J.127, 143-44 (1984) and in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai.America, Inc., see infra note
36.
23. 547 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Md. 1981).
24. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
25. COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH), % 25,328 (E.D. Ill. 1981).
26. Id.
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test, however, it is not clear whether the similarities were consid-
ered from the viewpoint of an ordinary player, an expert in the field,
or merely from the viewpoint of the impartial judge.
Atari v. Williams27 concerned "Jawbreaker," an imitator of
Pac Man which substituted a pair of clicking false teeth for the gob-
bler figure. Defendant's videogame displayed differences in the
maze, music, colors, and in the shape and movement of characters.
Although it was admitted that the idea was taken from Pac Man,
the court ruled that the differences were numerous, that "the laws
do not protect the strategy of a player symbol being guided through
a maze appearing to gobble-up dots in its path while being chased
through the maze by opponents," and that an ordinary observer
would not have noticed the similarity in the games.
The most frequently cited videogame copyright decision is the
Seventh Circuit case of Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer Electronics Corp..28 Philips involved a game entitled "K. C.
Munchkin" and plaintiff's game, Pac Man. The appellate court re-
versed the lower court finding of insufficient substantial similarity
and found that K. C. Munchkin had many "blatantly similar fea-
tures," including several.similar characters, maze dots, role reversal
features, and general maze configuration. The court criticized the
approach of the trial court as ignoring the more obvious similarities
while focusing on more minute differences in detail which under-
emphasized the extent of deliberate copying and alteration.
In addition, the court held that several segments constituted
"scenes a fake," that is, features which are indispensable or stan-
dard in the treatment of a given topic and therefore are not subject
to monopolization through copyright.29 Excluding the "scenes a
faire" elements from consideration, the appellate court stated that
the scope of copyright protection increases with the degree to which
the expression differs from the idea. On one end of the spectrum,
there are ideas which can be expressed in very few ways, for in-
stance the idea of a pin cast in the shape of a bee.30 On the other
end of the spectrum, there are ideas that are capable of a great range
of expressions, such as a Romeo and Juliet story. Contrary to the
view of the Williams court, it was held that the idea of a maze chase
game fell on the multiple-expression end of the spectrum and hence
the particularized expression merited broader copyright protection.
27. 217 U.S.P.Q. 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
28. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
29. Id at 616. See also Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
30. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalapakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
19871
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The appeals court found infringement because the idea of a maze
chase game did not dictate the particular characters of "gobblers"
or "ghost monsters" and the similarity in expression of these char-
acters would lead an ordinary game player to conclude K. C.
Munchkin was a copy of Pac Man.
31
The Philips test is reminiscent-,of the Hand abstractions test
and is a departure from prior dissection-oriented tests. It focuses on
similarities in the "total concept and feel" as perceived by the ordi-
nary observer or audience. Furthermore, where the ordinary audi-
ence is indiscriminating, as the court presumed was true with
videogames, the differences are given less weight as long as they are
minor. The rationale is to prevent plagiarists from circumventing
their wrongs by showing how much of the work they did not pirate.
A more analytical version of the substantial similarity test was
used in yet another Pac Man infringement case, Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artic Intern, Inc. .3 In an action to enjoin the distribution of "Puck
Man" circuit boards and Galaxian speed-up kits,33 the court used a
simple one-step test which focused on the differences between the
works in question and on the use of expert testimony. TheArtic test
thus differed from prior tests emphasizing the ordinary observer.
What is remarkable about the Artic opinion is that, although
the copyright was only on the audiovisual work, the court relied on
expert testimony regarding the similarity of the object code im-
printed on the ROM chips.3 4 In the Galaxian game, expert testi-
mony proved there were only 488 differences out of 10,000 bytes in
the source code printouts. Expert witnesses presented evidence that
the circuitry of the boards contained an error also found in Mid-
way's game. 5 Other than the names of the characters, the name of
the game, and the copyright notices, the court found the Artic Puck
Man game to be substantially similar, if not identical, to Pac Man.
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc. 36 is one of the few
decisions to faithfully apply the Krofft two-step extrinsic/intrinsic
31. Note that a different result was obtained in Amusement World due to the lack of
characters and in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, infra note 54, due to different characters.
32. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I11. 1982).
33. A "speed-up kit" is a set of ROMs and computer programs that increases the diffi-
culty of a particular video game to challenge more skilled players. ROM stands for "read
only memory" and is a computer program that is imprinted upon a silicon semiconductor
chip which is read by the computer which contains the chip.
34. Before the recent decisions in Broderbund and Kramer, the Artie court was the
only case that allowed expert evidence on the substantial similarity of the underlying pro-
grams when only the audiovisual work was copyrighted.
35. 547 F. Supp 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
36. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
[Vol. 3
COMPUTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
test. In an action to enjoin marketing of defendant's "Galaxian"
and "Pakri-Monster" hand-held imitations of Midway's arcade
games, the Bandai court applied the first stage of the Krofft test
using analytic dissection and expert testimony to ascertain the simi-
larity of the ideas behind the works. The court found that the idea
of Galaxian and Pac Man had been copied based on expert evidence
of similarity in musical themes, characters, background, and move-
ment sequences. In employing the intrinsic or ordinary-observer
prong of the test to determine whether plaintiffs' expressions had
been copied, the court rejected the defendant's argument that any
similarities in expression were due to inevitable similarities in the
underlying idea, stating:
[This] assumes... the idea... includes the physical characteris-
tics of the characters involved. If such reasoning were accepted,
a copyright defendant could always avoid liability merely by
describing a plaintiff's work in great detail and then labeling that
as a description of the "idea" of plaintiff's work. The "idea" of
any work could always be defined in such detail that the descrip-
tion of the expression would add nothing to the "idea," thus al-
lowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying. Such a
ploy cannot be allowed.37
The court ruled that an ordinary observer with an eye to gross fea-
tures rather than details would find a high degree of similarity be-
tween the games as a whole and therefore granted plaintiff's request
for a preliminary injunction.38
Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews 39 is a recent Fourth
Circuit case where a profitable arcade game, "Hi-Lo Double Up
Joker Poker," was held infringed by copies produced by an ex- dis-
tributor who hired an engineer to copy plaintiff's printed circuit
board and ROMs. Although the court did not specify the test it
applied, it used an ordinary observer approach to compare the au-
diovisual works and found that defendant's mere replacement of
names and phrases in the attract and play modes constituted only a
"frivolous variation." Additionally, the court used an expert dissec-
tion test on the similarities in the underlying computer programs
(which were not copyrighted by plaintiff) as probative evidence of
unlawful copying. The court found the computer programs to be
practically identical since many lines of code were literally dupli-
37. Id. at 148.
38. The court granted partial summary judgment on the copying issue (extrinsic test)
but felt the infringement issue was a matter of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. at
158.
39. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
1987]
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cated and, in fact, the defendant's program included plaintiff's hid-
den legend "9-24-80 M. Kramer Mfg." which would only appear
when the game's buttons were pressed in an abnormal code-like se-
quence. Accordingly, the lower court decision for the defendant
was vacated and the case remanded.
The most interesting and far-reaching audiovisual copyright
case to date is Broderbund, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.' The case
concerned "The Print Shop," a popular mass-marketed software
disk enabling a user to create and print customized greeting cards,
signs, banners, and posters. Initially, the defendant was hired by
plaintiff to develop an IBM-compatible version of the program but,
after the relationship deteriorated, Unison World incorporated that
information in producing a competing product, "Printmaster."
Broderbund filed suit alleging infringement of it's audiovisual copy-
right. On the issue of copyrightability, the Broderbund court be-
came the first to hold, in a non-videogame context, that the screen
output of a computer program including menu screens, input for-
mats41 and the sequencing of screens is protected by copyright from
nonliteral copying. The court held this subject matter was pro-
tected by copyright because it was not (1) a merging of expression
and idea as held by the earlier decision in Synercom,42 (2) a
noncopyrightable mechanical or utilitarian feature of the work,4 a
nor (3) a set of noncopyrightable rules and instructions."
On the issue of actual copying, both direct evidence and cir-
cumstantial evidence of copying were found.45 The court applied
40. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
41. A "menu screen" is an introductory image screen presenting multiple options from
which the user selects a program function. An "input format" is a particular form for enter-
ing data into the computer with specific areas reserved for entering certain data.
42. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., see infra note 50, held
input formats were non-copyrightable because the "idea" behind them was only expressible in
a limited way, hence the idea and expression "merged."
Broderbund introduced the "Stickybear Printer" into evidence as a competing mass
marketed software printing program which was not substantially similar to "Print Shop's"
audiovisual format to rebut defendant's claims that the nature of the subject matter forced
certain format expressions by the defendant.
43. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980). Note
that the traditional notion that copyright law does not cover utilitarian features is quickly
eroding with the application of copyright law to computer progams,
44. Affiliated Hospital Products, Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir.
1975).
45. Direct evidence was based upon the defendant programmer's admission that he di-
rectly copied aspects of the Broderbund program. Indirect evidence related to the findings of
access and substantial similarity. Although the argument might be made that the application
of the substantial similarity test in Broderbund was dicta because direct copying was admit-
ted, it can also be contended that proof of direct copying is insufficient proof in itself where
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the two-step Krofft substantial similarity test. In applying the ex-
trinsic test, the court discovered a substantial similarity in the un-
derlying ideas, based upon the opinions of expert witnesses that
both programs performed virtually identical functions.
46
In using the intrinsic test to determine substantial similarity of
the expression, the court deviated from the standard Krofft test fo-
cus on the "total concept and feel" of the work from an ordinary
observer's viewpoint and applied an expert dissection test in place of
the second step of the Krofft test. The court found the expression of
the output of both programs substantially similar in the menu
screen formats, the sequencing of graphics screens, the appearance
of screen layouts, and also noted that the defendant's program re-
tained keyboard limitations characteristic of the original "Print
Shop" program which were inconsistent with the claim of an origi-
nal program designed for the more flexible IBM PC keyboard.
While the Broderbund court did find similarities in screen format,
they were not literal duplications. Therefore, the court based its
finding of substantial similarity on the rationale of the Whelan
court 7 and held that verbatim duplication of certain audiovisual
aspects of a utilitarian computer program was not necessary to
prove infringement.48
2. Similarity Tests and Computer Programs
The second set of cases involves the application of similarity
tests to determine copyright infringement where the computer pro-
gram itself is the copyrighted work.49 The contrast in subject mat-
ter from the audiovisual copyright cases presents a different
problem in determining substantial similarity. Since the program
itself is unintelligible to the average person, unlike a play or novel,
special difficulties are presented in applying traditional legal tests.
In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., the
the amount of text directly copied is not proven to be substantial. To the extent that the
fragments copied are of insufficient magnitude to constitute infringement, the application of
the substantial similarity test to the total Unison World program using the nonliteral method-
ology is not dicta.
46. 648 F. Supp. at 1136-37. The idea behind Printmaster was exactly the same as the
idea behind plaintiff's original program Print Shop. Both programs allow users to create
greeting cards, signs, banners and posters with user selected combinations of text, graphics,
and borders printed on a dot matrix printer.
47. See infra note 76.
48. For a discussion, See Note, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs Extends
Beyond Literal Duplication to Structure, Sequence, and Organization, 3 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 223 (1987).
49. Computer programs copyrights are registered as "literary works."
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first computer law decision issued by the federal courts,50
Synercom, a software development company, transformed an un-
successful public domain program into a highly marketable archi-
tectural design program with "user friendly" input formats for the
structural analysis of certain building materials under specified
stress conditions. After leaving Synercom, two employees formed
defendant EDI and began to market a competing program that in-
corporated Synercom's convenient input formats into its preproces-
sor program and also appropriated the contents of Synercom users'
manuals, both of which were copyrighted as literary works. With-
out significant development expenses to recoup, EDI could afford to
underprice Synercom. Synercom filed suit for copyright in-
fringement.
In its analysis, the court did not apply the substantial similarity
test. Instead, the court focused upon whether the defendants had
copied plaintiff's idea or expression regarding the input formats.
Despite conceding that EDI's "statements in its preprocessor pro-
gram are derived directly and precisely from the copyrighted man-
ual card formats,"'" the court nonetheless ruled that the ordering
and sequence of data in input formats is an idea and not a copy-
rightable expression. This holding has been criticized, primarily for
not using the substantial similarity test to determine the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy and for confusing the existence of copyright
protection with the question of copyright infringement . 2
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc. 53 con-
cerned plaintiff's videogame "Defender" with copyrights on both
the audiovisual work and on the underlying computer program.
Artie sold circuit board kits containing ROM chips which produced
Artic's "Defense Command" game. These kits contained a com-
puter program virtually identical to plaintiff's. Rather than employ-
ing the traditional Hand substantial similarity test or the Krofft test,
the court used the expert dissection similarity test first employed in
Midway v. Artic Intern and found that the audiovisual work was
identical but for minor differences, such as the substitution of "De-
fense Command" for "Defender." The court also used expert testi-
mony to find infringement of the underlying program based on
substantial similarities in the ROM-embedded programs finding
50. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
51. 463 F. Supp. 983, 1012 (D. Conn. 1978).
52. Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Sub-
stantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1281 (1984).
53. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
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that at least 85% of the lines of code were identical, that the defend-
ant's program had copied plaintiff's programming errors, and that
the Artie Program had a "buried" copyright notice within it which
read "Copyright 1980-Williams Electronics."
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon,54 Midway sought to enjoin the
infringement of the audiovisual and program copyrights on its coin-
operated Pac Man game by defendant's "Cute-See" modification
kit. This kit included a set of ROM chip replacements which made
the game more challenging by adding sophistication and increasing
speed of play, pressure-sensitive graphics to cover the Pac Man
trademarks and instructions on how to transform the arcade game
into the Cute-See arcade game.
Examining the audiovisual work infringement claim, the court
found differences in maze complexity, sound effects, and found the
Cute-See characters bore no resemblance to Pac Man and the four
ghost monsters." Based on the holding in Philips56 which held the
appropriation of character expressions was determinative, the
Strohon court found the distinctive copyrightable features of the
Pac Man were not present in the defendant's work and therefore
plaintiff's audiovisual work had not been infringed.
Turning to the question of whether the defendant's game in-
fringed the copyright on the underlying Pac Man program even
though there was no infringement on the audiovisual display, the
court employed an expert comparison of the printouts of plaintiff's
and defendants' ROM-embedded programs. The court considered
expert testimony which compared the source code printouts from
both sets of ROM chips.57 It was established that 89% of the
16,000 bytes in the Pac Man ROMs were identically reproduced in
defendant's corresponding ROMs and when the important instruc-
tion bytes were segregated from the data bytes,5 8 over 97% of the
13,382 instruction locations were duplicated. The Strohon court
found that the "degree of similarity, while not absolute, is substan-
tial" and concluded the defendant illegally copied, modified and re-
sold the Pac Man ROM chip programs.
54. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
55. The "characters" were colored squares.
56. See supra note 28.
57. This was accomplished with microcomputer development laboratory equipment
which hooks up to the chip itself.
58. Midway's experts distinguished between "instructions" that direct the movements
of game characters in response to player's movement of the controls and "data" that are
directions to the computer to display certain information on the screen, like "High Score" or
"Cute-See."
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In a case before the International Trade Commission, In the
Matter of Certain Personal Computers and the Components
Thereof,9 the ITC used a quantitative expert dissection approach
and found substantial similarity based on literal duplication of 25%
of the lines of code in the subroutines. Though the Strohon court
found infringement based on 97% duplication, the ITC held that
"substantial similarity ... does not require complete identity....
Sufficient similar material is involved here and that material appears
to be qualitatively significant, since it includes 23 of the 32 most
useful subroutines of the approximately 70 subroutines in the
Autostart ROM program."'
The next case to emerge was SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Com-
puter Systems, Inc. 61 an action by computer software developer and
licensor, SAS, against a licensee, S & H, for copyright infringement
relating to the misappropriation of a statistical analysis program.
After negotiations broke down between the defendants and SAS for
developing and marketing a version of the program for the VAX
computer, defendants acquired a licensed copy of the SAS program
to obtain the codes. They recoded and transferred the program into
a VAX format and then further modified it using a text editor to
produce a marketable S & H statistical analysis program for VAX-
compatible computers. SAS filed suit against S & H for copyright
infringement of the underlying program in addition to other causes
of action.
The SAS court employed a substantial similarity test which in-
volved a detailed expert comparison revealing similarities which in-
cluded: forty-four identical lines of source code; numerous
instances of near literal and organizational copying; the term
"SAS" was found in at least 145 lines of code in S & H's first pro-
gram; incoherent statements in the S & H program reflected hasty
editing-out of identifying material; the functionless vestige of an
earlier abandoned SAS subroutine was found in the S & H program;
and there was a lack of design documentation for the S & H prod-
uct. Accordingly, the court enjoined the marketing, use and further
development of the infringing program.
E. F. Johnson v. Uniden Corp.62 was added to the rapidly ex-
panding list of cases dealing with copyright protection of computer
programs in 1985. In 1980, E. F. Johnson Co. was the first on the
59. COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) % 25,651 at 18,927-9 (1984).
60. Id.
61. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
62. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
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market with its ROM microchip programmed mobile radio commu-
nication systems for police cars, taxis, and other mobile units which
automatically maximized operational efficiency by pooling radio
channels.63 By 1984, engineers from Uniden had disassembled
Johnson's microchip program and used it to design their own mo-
bile radio to compete with Johnson's units at around a 35% lower
retail price. Johnson filed a copyright infringement action against
Uniden and moved the court for a preliminary injunction to stop
Uniden's continuing sales.
Acknowledging that the test of substantial similarity in the
Eighth Circuit is "whether the work is recognizable by an ordinary
observer as having been taken from the copyrighted source,"'  the
court applied its own version of the "iterative approach" test to the
new high technology subject matter.65
The iterative approach requires proof (1) that the defendant used
the copyrighted work in preparing the alleged copy, which may
be established by proof of access and similarity sufficient to rea-
sonably infer use of the copyrighted work; and (2) that the de-
fendant's work is an iterative reproduction, that is one produced
by iterative or exact duplication of substantial portions of the
copyrighted work.66
The Johnson court used expert dissection and a detailed com-
parison of features between Johnson's and Uniden's program
microcode. 67  Both programs used the same "Barker Code" se-
63. Id. at 1488.
64. Withol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962).
65. Although the court stated that "Under either the traditional 'ordinary observer' or
the contemporary 'iterative' test of substantial similarity," the facts would lead to a finding of
substantial similarity, 623 F. Supp. at 1493, this somewhat conclusory statement appears
unwarranted. Under the Withol test, an "ordinary observer" probably would not have the
expertise to recognize the similarity of microcode "Barker code," "H-Matrix," "ghost code,"
"select call prohibit" errors, and the like. The Johnson court probably made this statement
to minimize the apparent inconsistency between citing the 8th Circuit "ordinary observer"
Withol test and then applying the fundamentally different "iterative test" of substantial simi-
larity.
There are some indications of confusion in the Johnson court's analysis where the "ex-
pert dissection" test is confused with the "iterative" test and the Whelan approach is con-
fused with the "total look and feel" ordinary observer test. Confusion in the area of
copyright analysis as applied to high technology subject matter is not unusual. Some clarifi-
cation of this type of confusion is provided by a conceptual segregation of the three dimen-
sions of substantial similarity tests into (1) expert versus lay observers, (2) analytic versus
synthetic approaches, and (3) literal versus non-literal comparisons, as discussed infra.
66. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985).
67. Interestingly enough, the Johnson court went through the entire analysis without
deciding the copyrightability of microcode issue. This issue was subsequently decided in the
affirmative in the 9th Circuit by Judge Ingram in N.E.C. Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F. Supp.
590, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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quence for identification of incoming calls and "H-Matrix" codes
for identifying transmission errors. The Uniden program repeated
errors, anomalies and functionless "ghost code" remnants in the
Johnson program and thirty-eight of forty-four routines included
literal copying of code. Moreover, the manual for the Uniden pro-
gram contained large segments of text lifted verbatim from the
Johnson manual and the court held that "[v]erbatim copying of a
computer manual is inferential evidence of pirating of the underly-
ing software."68 Accordingly, the court found that Uniden had in-
fringed Johnson's copyrighted program and ordered the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.6 9
Another case, Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman,70 concerned a
copyrighted teleprompting computer program developed by Q-Co
for use in television broadcasting and theatrical performances to
display and scroll scripts. At the time, such programs were only
compatible with the Atari computer. However, the idea occurred
to two computer scientists, defendants in the action, who worked
for Q-Co that it would be technologically possible and economically
profitable to design such a prompter program for the IBM personal
computer. The defendants left the employ of Q-Co and formed
Computer Prompting Corporation (CPC) to develop and market
the IBM-PC prompting program.
Q-Co filed a copyright infringement action and requested a
preliminary injunction against defendants. At the hearing, both
sides presented expert testimony and evidence comparing the Q-Co
VPS-500 and the CPC-1000 programs at the hearing. Many differ-
ences were due to hardware deficiencies of the IBM-PC's graphics
which required extra programming and memory. Other differences
were due to the different languages used (BASIC for the Atari and
PASCAL for the IBM-PC). Similarities included: (1) four similar
modules (a title module which was required for the Atari but un-
necessary for the IBM, an opening menu module, a text scroll and
edit module, and a character module); (2) similar menu lists using
identical command terms; (3) that both programs used a high-level
programming language for the second module and low level assem-
68. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (D. Minn. 1985).
69. "The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted, and analyzed
plaintiff's code does not, in and of itself, establish pirating ..... Had Uniden contented itself
with surveying the general outline of the EFJ program, thereafter converting the scheme into
detailed code through its own imagination, creativity, and independent thought, a claim of
infringement would not have arisen." 623,F. Supp. at 1501 n.17.
70. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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bly language for the third module; and (4) that the programs' char-
acter generation process operated similarly.
The court held that the CPC-1000 program was not a copy or
paraphrase of the Atari-based Q-Co program,71 that it "employ[ed]
wholly distinct algorithms,"' 72 and that there was "no direct evi-
dence that [the defendant] employed the VPS material and indeed
direct copying was impossible since the Atari programming was in
BASIC and IBM in PASCAL. '73  Although a defendant-engineer
admitted he used the structure and concept of the VPS-500 in re-
writing the CPC-1000 program, the court held that the programs
were not substantially similar since there was no literal duplication
of code, the similarities in structure and organization were "an in-
herent part of any prompting program" and the program modules'
"order and organization can be more closely analogized to the con-
cept of wheels for the car rather than the intricacies of a particular
suspension system."'74 Accordingly, the court held that, notwith-
standing similarities in structure, sequence and organization, the
idea rather than the expression was used and therefore copyright
infringement had not been established.
The most recent" and controversial computer copyright case
71. Id. at 614.
72. Id. at 614.
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 616.
75. At this writing, yet another computer program substantial similarity case has been
decided, Plains Cotton Cooperative Association v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., slip.
op., No. 86-1126 (5th Cir., Jan 21, 1987). In this action, Plains unsuccessfully appealed a
denial of their preliminary injunction against Goodpasture. Plains, a non-profit cotton coop-
erative developed a mainframe software system called "Telcot" which provided members
with information on cotton prices and availability, accounting services, and the capability to
electronically complete sales transactions. The employee software engineers who developed
the program left Plains and eventually joined defendant Goodpasture Computer Service to
develop a personal computer version of Telcot and brought a diskette containing the Telcot
source code with them. This was used to design Goodpasture's personal computer version of
Telcot, called "GEMS." When Goodpasture marketed GEMS, Plains filed suit for copyright
infringement in District Court and moved for a preliminary injunction.
Expert testimony was presented showing the similarities between the two programs.
Although the record reveals no evidence of verbatim copying (because such copying would
have been improbable given the transformation from a large mainframe computer to a small
personal computer program), there was evidence presented of "organizational copying."
Nonetheless, the District Court presumably concluded that this was insufficient to find sub-
stantial similarity and denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, and plaintiff
appealed.
In the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that the District Court applied the
wrong test for substantial similarity because it only focused upon verbatim copying and not
upon organizational copying, urging the court to adopt the non-literal reasoning of the Third
Circuit in Whelan v. Jaslow. The court, instead, declined to accept the non-literal test of
Whelan citing Judge Higginbotham's Synercom decision (from the same Circuit) with ap-
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is the landmark Third Circuit decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 76  In Whelan, a dispute arose be-
tween an independent software contractor (Whelan) and a client
(Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.) over the ownership of a commis-
sioned computer program. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, run by Rand
Jaslow, hired programmer Elaine Whelan to develop a program for
accounting, inventory and billing functions which Whelan subse-
quently named Dentalab and copyrighted as a literary work. Rand
Jaslow realized the profit which could be made if the program could
be rewritten from EDL to BASIC and adapted to run on IBM-PC
personal computers. After attempting to write such a program
himself using his misappropriated copy of the Dentalab source
code, Jaslow hired an expert programmer to build upon his work
and finish what was to be called the "Dentcom PC" program. Sub-
sequently, Jaslow formed Dentcom, Inc. to market the software.
Thereafter, Jaslow Dental Laboratory filed suit against Whelan As-
sociates in state court alleging trade secret misappropriation. Whe-
lan fied a copyright infringement action in the United States
District Court which was consolidated with the removed state
action.
After the District Court established Rand Jaslow's access to
the source code of the Dentalab program, it turned to consider the
matter of substantial similarity. The court applied an expert dissec-
tion substantial similarity test which was not limited to verbatim
proval. The Plains decision suffers from several logical flaws. Parts of the opinion imply that
the decision was based upon a repudiation of Whelan and a literal substantial similarity test.
However, the court in Plains never got to the point of even applying a substantial similarity
test to determine whether copying or infringement existed but rather based its decision on a
preliminary determination that "many of the similarities... are dictated by the externalities
of the cotton market" and "decline[d] to hold that those patterns cannot constitute 'ideas' in
a computer context." Therefore, the court's statements regarding Whelan's non-literal sub-
stantial similarity test are obiter dicta because that issue is never reached.
An alternative analysis would have been to establish access and apply a test of substan-
tial similarity to the comparison of the two programs. If the court decided to apply an itera-
tive test, presumably the absence of literal copying would have led to the same decision and
provided an actual basis for rejecting the Whelan approach. It is suggested here that the
decision on whether a particular expression is dictated by surrounding circumstances and is
therefore not copyrightable should logically be made after, rather than before, a preliminary
determination of access and impermissible copying of the author's expression for the reason
that it is only after the court determines that the defendant actually copied plaintiff's work
(literally or by paraphrase) that the court should reach the matter of deciding whether de-
fendant had no choice but to copy plaintiff's pattern because circumstances restricted the
alternative expressions.
76. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'g 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert. denied
93 L. Ed.2d 831 (Jan. 13, 1986). See the discussion of Whelan in Note, Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs Extends Beyond Literal Duplication to Structure, Sequence, and Or-
ganization, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 223 (1987).
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copying as required by the "iterative test."' " The court held for the
plaintiff based on expert testimony that, though written in different
languages and involving no literal duplication, the programs were
sufficiently similar in several significant areas: (1) the fie structures,
(2) the screen outputs, and (3) the modular organization of the pro-
gram into order entry, invoicing, accounts receivable, end-of-day
and end-of-month subroutines which performed nearly identically.
Jaslow Laboratory appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peal attacking the District Court's finding of substantial similarity
as error arguing that it was beyond the existing scope of copyright
protection for software since no prior case had found infringement
in the absence of evidence of literal copying. Notwithstanding the
confines of prior case law, the Court of Appeal moved beyond the
restrictive iterative approach and utilized broader notions from
copyright law to hold that a program's copyright covers nonliteral
elements of the program including the structure of the program it-
self. Following the lead of Judge Hand's original abstractions test
in Nichols, the Whelan court could find no sound reason why com-
puter programs should not be subject to the same nonliteral test
that applies to other subject matter.
Before Whelan, the substantial similarity test in computer
copyright cases was limited to literal or "fragmented literal" simi-
larity where fragments have been exactly copied and incorporated
into the defendant's work. The decision in Whelan extends copy-
right protection to cover comprehensive nonliteral copying of:
(1) the general format of file structures to the extent that they are
innovative in arrangement and convey information;78 (2) the overall
structure, ordering, and processing sequences of component pro-
gram modules; and (3) translations to other computer languages.
The progressive approach of the Whelan court marks the genesis of
a far-reaching expansion in copyright protection for computer
programs.7 9
77. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264 (1984).
78. Contra the substance of the early decision in Synercom.
79. Additional cases have not been covered in this discussion because they are tangen-
tially relevant to the application of the substantial similarity test to computer subject matter:
Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (no substantial similarity issue, total identical copy), Dy-
namic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (deriv-
ative work issue), Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1985) (copyrighted
commodities trading manual infringed by commodities trading program), Koontz v. Jaf-
farian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986) (copyrighted manual with data base for estimating elec-
trical contractor's bids held infringed where data stored without copyright notice on
1987]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
C. Summary: An Analysis of Existing Tests for Substantial
Similarity Applied to Computer Technology
The foregoing history of the substantial similarity test discloses
considerable variation and inconsistency in its formulation and ap-
plication. However, substantial similarity tests, from Nichols to
Whelan, may be systematically classified along several dimensions:
(1) the approach which is taken to evaluate the similarities and dif-
ferences; (2) the perspective from which these similarities and differ-
ences are evaluated; and (3) the measures of similarity as restricted
or expanded.80 First, the approaches utilized tend to be either ana-
lytic, involving a breakdown of elements and a detailed dissection of
differences and similarities or synthetic, resisting a dissection ap-
proach in favor of a gestalt-type "overall look and feel" test. Sec-
ond, the perspectives for evaluation are inclined to be either from
the viewpoint of an expert in the field or from the standpoint of an
ordinary observer. Finally, the measures of similarity vary in terms
of their level of abstraction from the low-level iterative approach to
the more abstract nonliteral approach. Segregating these variables
reveals at least six different types of similarity tests which have actu-
ally been employed by the courts.81
computer tapes was copied by infringing manual), Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986) (infringement of computer program manual by com-
peting program and manual).
80. It is important to note that these classifications of types of tests are often based on
matters of emphasis. Some cases may use overlapping tests, e.g. Amusement World at one
point also mentions "overall concept and feel."
81. Theoretically more combinations of approaches are possible, however these are the
most significant combinations.
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Figure 1. Varieties of Substantial Similarity Tests
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1. The Expert Overall Similarity Test: The
Abstractions Test
Though the classic version of this test has not been applied in
the computer field, it is the original abstractions test as used by
Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation.2
The test uses experts to compare the original work with the alleged
copy in determining whether the degree of similarity is at such an
abstract level as to constitute an appropriation of the unprotectable
idea rather than the expression. In conducting this test, the court
uses an expert perspective to compare similarities and differences,
not on a point-by-point basis, but on a general comprehensive level
to ascertain whether the organization of the expression of the al-
82. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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leged copy is substantially similar enough to the original work to
constitute a wrongful taking. The classic version of Learned Hand's
abstractions test has not been extensively used in the computer field
because the use of expert testimony is seen as more compatible with
a point-by-point dissection. However, there is no reason that an
expert overall similarity test could not be used in cases involving
computer games or non-game visual displays.
2. The Audience Overall Similarity Test: The Total
Look and Feel Test
The audience overall similarity test is a later version of Judge
Learned Hand's abstractions test which excludes expert testimony
and makes the comparison from the standpoint of the ordinary ob-
server. This audience test or ordinary observer test was first applied
in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer"3 and was incorporated into the
second stage of the Krofft 14 and Arnstein 5 tests.
This gestalt version of the ordinary observer test was intro-
duced into the computer field by Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd. 6 and
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.87
to assess the substantial similarity of computer output in an audio-
visual games context. In Philips, the Seventh Circuit focused on
whether the total concept and feel of K. C. Munchkin was substan-
tially similar to that of Pac Man as experienced by the ordinary
player. The court deliberately avoided an analytic dissection of dif-
ferences because this would unduly favor defendants who could de-
fend their misappropriations by pointing out the minor differences
and changes they made. The Philips version of the audience overall
similarity test tends to favor the plaintiff because the evaluation is
made from the standpoint of the audience, and in the computer field
it is reasonable to assume that an ordinary observer would be less
discriminating than an expert. Where the audience is less discrimi-
nating, differences between works are generally given less weight.
Therefore, a finding of substantial similarity between the expres-
sions of the works is more likely."8
83. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
84. Sid and Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1977).
86. See supra note 25.
87. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
88. Other aspects of Philips also recommend it as a plaintiffs test, such as the focus on
the many possible expressions which an idea may have depending upon where it falls on the
spectrum of specificity.
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The court in Broderbund Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. 89 incorpo-
rated aspects of this test into its analysis in the intrinsic phase of the
Krofft test. The focus on overall similarities in expression and the
down-playing of minor differences from the perspective of an ordi-
nary observer would probably have led to a different outcome in
Atari, Inc. v. Williams90 and possibly in Atari Inc. v. Amusement
World, Inc.91 had the audience overall similarity test been properly
applied in those cases. 92
3. The Audience Analytic Similarity Test
The use of a similarity test featuring point-by-point compari-
sons of the differences between works without the aid of expert testi-
mony was first applied to computer output in 1981 in Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Dirkschneider.93 In focusing on the differences between the
plaintiff's three videogames and those of the defendant, the court
felt the proper standpoint of evaluation was the perspective of the
ordinary game player. The court held that the differences would not
be readily apparent to the average player unless they were subjected
to side-by-side comparison. Since such side-by-side evaluation is in-
herent in the expert dissection test, it might be concluded that the
Dirkschneider test, when focusing on minor differences, is more
favorable to the plaintiff.
Virtually the same test was used in Atari v. Williams but with a
different result. In enumerating the differences in color, music,
movement, and maze shape, the court held that although the idea
was admittedly copied, an ordinary observer would not conclude
that they were substantially similar.
Similarly, the audience analytic test yielded results favorable to
the defendant in Amusement World where the court concluded that
an ordinary observer would not find the feel of the games to be the
same. The court neutralized the greater number of similarities by
concluding that they were inevitable given the limited expressions
of the idea behind the game. However, the Amusement World court
differed in its application of this test from the courts in
Dirkschneider and Atari v. Williams insofar as those courts focused
on the enumeration of differences, while the Amusement World
court enumerated similarities as well.
89. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
90. 217 U.$.P.Q. 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
91. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
92. It is interesting to compare the approaches of Philips and Atari v. Williams since
they both deal with the "Pac Man" game.
93. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
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The Kramer court94 likewise used an audience analytic similar-
ity test in evaluating the infringement of an audiovisual work. As in
Dirkschneider, the court performed a point-by-point analysis of dif-
ferences and indicated that the variations in features between the
programs were minor, primarily consisting of the textual replace-
ment of company names, game titles, and stock phrases. It was
found that the differences enumerated would not negate the over-
whelming similarities or keep the ordinary game player from the
conclusion that the games were substantially similar.9
Generally, the audience analytic similarity test may have a ten-
dency to be more favorable to the defendant than other tests. The
test focuses on the enumeration of differences on a point-by-point
basis and then asks whether an ordinary observer would notice
them. Unless, as in Dirkschneider or Kramer, the differences are
very few and very minor, it is probable that the courts will find the
differences noticeable by the ordinary consumer and conclude such
works are not substantially similar. Conversely, if the overall audi-
ence similarity test were used on the same facts, it it more likely to
favor the plaintiff because it tends to submerge such differences in
the application of the test.
4. The Expert Analytic Similarity Test: The Expert
Dissection Test
Although the expert analytic similarity test is typically applied
to cases in which the underlying computer program is copyrighted
as a literary work, this is not always the case. In Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Artic Intern, Inc.,96 the copyright was on the audiovisual display,
yet the court allowed expert analysis of the similarity of the under-
lying ROM chip programs. 97 Similarly, in Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Bandai-America, the court used professors of music to compare the
music patterns of the games in order to evaluate similarities in the
audiovisual works in the first phase of a Krofft test.98
Ever since its first application to computer programs in 1982, 99
the expert analysis test has become the standard test when the un-
derlying software is copyrighted as a literary work. Because the
94. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
95. Note that the Kramer court did admit extensive expert testimony on the points of
similarity and difference in the linked underlying computer program.
96. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
97. Accord Kramer and Whelan.
98. Although Bandai was not part of the 9th Circuit, it nonetheless opted to adopt the
Krofft test.
99. See Williams v. Artic, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
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nature of a computer program is quite unlike a play or story, the
gestalt concept of the expert overall similarity approach is typically
rejected in favor of the point-by-point dissection approach which is
better suited to comparing lines of code."° Since the workings and
structure of a computer program are unintelligible to an ordinary
observer, the use of experts becomes necessary. However, the in-
compatibility of the traditional ordinary observer test with the new
high technology subject matter has caused confusion on the part of
some courts and observers in mistakenly identifying this expert dis-
section approach with the iterative approach. They are not identi-
cal. The iterative approach restricts the perspective to the expert
viewpoint and restricts the measure of infringement to literal or ver-
batim copying. Since courts have used the expert dissection test
without the verbatim limitation, it is important not to equate the
expert dissection test with the iterative approach.
The expert dissection test was first hinted at in Synercom Tech-
nology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.."'1 The court in Synercom
admitted expert evidence on a point-by-point comparison of the in-
put format programs and found them to be virtually identical.
However, the court never conducted a formal substantial similarity
test since it made an a priori decision that input formats were ideas
and not copyrightable.
The first true application of the expert analytic similarity test
to determine substantial similarity in the computer program context
was in Williams Electronics v. Artic International, 10 2 where both the
program and audiovisual display were copyrighted. The court ap-
plied an expert analysis test to both media and found that the audio-
visual displays were virtually identical and the programs contained
over 85% identical code in addition to hidden legends and common
errors.
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 3 the court applied an expert
analysis approach to a similar situation where the games' display
was copyrighted as an audiovisual work and the underlying pro-
gram as a literary work. Although the court found no substantial
similarity in the audiovisual displays, the expert evidence showed
approximately 90% of the code to be identical and the court found
substantial similarity in the computer programs. The same expert
100. See for example, SAS Computers, 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) and Johnson
v. Uniden, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
101. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
102. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
103. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Iii. 1983).
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analytic similarity test with a focus on the amount of similar code
was continued by the ITC in In the Matter of Certain Personal
Computers1 with a finding of infringement based on evidence that
only 25% of the code had been literally duplicated.
In SAS Institute, Inc. v. Computer Systems, Inc.,° 5 the applica-
tion of the expert dissection test also centered on a detailed enumer-
ation of similarities, rather than differences in the code.
Furthermore, the SAS court took a progressive approach by supple-
menting the substantial similarity test with circumstantial evidence
of copying. The court's analysis in SAS is one of the more sophisti-
cated applications of the expert dissection test to a computer pro-
gram. Interestingly, although the decision in the case was based
upon blatant literal copying, the court indicated that nonliteral evi-
dence of similar structure and organization would be relevant to
determining substantial similarity. This idea would come to fruition
in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc..
Finally, the E.F. Johnson v. Uniden Corp. 10 6 court applied an
iterative version of the expert dissection test in finding the Uniden
radio system software infringed Johnson's program. Detailed ex-
pert analysis was used and, although it was dicta, the court indi-
cated that if there was no literal copying, there would have been no
copyright cause of action. The Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman
court 10 7 applied a similar iterative dissection test in holding the lack
of evidence of literal copying of the teleprompter program justified a
decision for the defendant.
5. Two-Stage Similarity Tests: Extrinsic/Intrinsic
The fifth type of similarity test to be used in the computer
copyright field is a combination of prior tests into a two stage test.
Originally developed by Judge Frank in Arnstein and refined in
Krofft, this test was first applied to computer output in Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc. 's The extrinsic test uses the ex-
pert dissection test to determine if the idea behind the product was
copied and the intrinsic test uses the ordinary observer test to evalu-
ate whether the expression has been misappropriated. The Bandai
court used experts in music and software to detail the similarities in
104. See supra note 59.
105. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
106. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
107. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982).
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the extrinsic phase and found the intrinsic test of substantial simi-
larity satisfied from the standpoint of an ordinary player.
The court in Broderbund also applied this Ninth Circuit test
and determined that the extrinsic test was satisfied by expert evi-
dence showing that the ideas behind the programs in question were
substantially the same and found the intrinsic test was met because
an ordinary observer would find the expression of the works to be
substantially similar. However, in the second test, the Broderbund
court did not apply the traditional audience overall similarity test
(the total look and feel test) but rather used the audience analytic
similarity test with extensive use of detailed comparisons between
the audiovisual displays of both programs.
6. The Nonliteral Substantial Similarity Test
A new type of substantial similarity test has come to the fore-
front with the well-reasoned decision in Whelan v. Jaslow09 which,
in one respect, brings copyright law "full circle" back to Nichols.
The approach taken in Whelan takes an unprecedented position on
the definition of copying by refusing to restrict the scope of com-
puter copyright protection to literally copied elements. Instead,
Whelan harks back to Judge Learned Hand's early remark in Nich-
ols that copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a pla-
giarist would escape by immaterial variations.""'  Under the
Whelan test, the mere fact that the defendant has paraphrased
rather than literally copied the work will not preclude a finding of
substantial similarity.111
The Whelan court combined this nonliteral approach with an
expert dissection test in judging the substantial similarity of the ap-
plications programs at issue. The court evaluated expert evidence
of similarity in each program's file structures, screen outputs, and
arrangements of subroutines. However, since the infringing pro-
gram was copied in a different computer language, there was no
literal duplication. Accordingly, the Whelan court took a flexible
approach which added to the expert dissection test by blending ele-
ments of the expert overall similarity test. The court then examined
the similarities in the overall organization, structure, and sequenc-
ing of the two programs and found them substantially similar.
The court proposed a means-ends rule for determining the
109. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), afftg, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert denied,
93 L. Ed.2d 831 (Jan. 13, 1986).
110. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2nd Cir. 1930).
111. See NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGr § 13.03[A] (especially footnote 8).
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copyrightable expression of a computer program in a way that tran-
scends its literal embodiment. Since computer programs, unlike
works of art, are functional and utilitarian, the rule for distinguish-
ing idea from expression can be framed in terms of the purpose or
function of the program representing the idea and the means for
achieving the purpose being equal to the expression of the idea. The
court stated the rule as follows:
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose
or function would be part of the [protectable] expression of the
idea .... Where there are various means of achieving the desired
purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the
purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea. 112
The 'expression of the idea' in a software computer program is
the manner in which the program operates, controls and regu-
lates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retain-
ing, correlating, and producing useful information either on a
screen, print out or by audio communication.1 13
Using this rule and approach, the court indicated that the idea of a
program for the efficient management of a dental laboratory's ac-
counting, inventory, and marketing tasks could be accomplished
with a number of different programming structures and, therefore,
the structure, sequence, and organization of the manner in which
the Dentalab program accomplishes this is part of the program's
protectable expression.
The court in Broderbund followed the lead of Whelan.
Although it applied the two-stage Krofft test, it also adopted the
nonliteral approach of Whelan and the means-ends test. It found
that the function of a menu-driven program allowing the user to
print greeting cards, signs, banners, and posters was an idea and
that there are a number of different expressions for accomplishing
this function. Therefore, the court held that in the absence of literal
or verbatim copying of audiovisual images, the overall arrangement,
structure and sequencing of a program's menu screens, input for-
mats, text, and artwork is protected under the copyright laws.
In effect, Whelan established the nonliteral test for computer
programs copyrighted as literary works and Broderbund instituted
it for computer displays copyrighted as audiovisual works. With
this "double-barreled" revolution in the scope of a program's pro-
112. 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. Id.
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tectable expression, computer copyright law has entered a new
frontier.
III. A NEW UNIFORM SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST FOR
COMPUTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: THE
INTEGRATIVE TEST
The scope and application of the substantial similarity test in
the field of computer copyright law has displayed prodigious varia-
bility and has recently been developing with extreme rapidity."'
The field is swiftly coming of age and there is a need for a uniform
substantial similarity test for computer copyright law which pro-
vides a better solution to the problems of software developers who
need protection against parasitic copiers.
To begin to meet this need, an integrative test is proposed here
for determining substantial similarity of computer programs and
output which follows the progressive direction of the courts in Wlhe-
lan and Broderbund.
A new uniform substantial similarity test for computer copy-
right infringement cases should incorporate the strengths of the
prior tests while avoiding or minimizing their weaknesses. Aside
from unsystematic variability and inconsistency in application, the
most significant weaknesses of existing tests are (1) a limitation to
verbatim copying, (2) an incompatibility between the test and the
subject matter, and (3) a narrow focus which does not consider rele-
vant external evidence. Hence, the elements of the integrative test
are (1) a nonliteral measure of copyright infringement, (2) an inte-
gration of prior substantial similarity tests to provide the best cover-
age of the subject matter, and (3) a flexible approach which
encourages the introduction of probative evidence on external as-
pects related to the issue of substantial similarity.
A. The Integrative Test Is Nonliteral
The iterative test for computer copyright has outlived its use-
fulness because it does not offer adequate protection against para-
phrase copying of computer programs and output. The iterative
test, as originally proposed, was intended to clearly draw the line
between the idea and the protectable expression.
Focusing on the literal similarities between the two works and
114. For example, in the year between the rough draft of this comment and the final
draft, five significant cases on computer copyright substantial similarity tests were decided: Q-
Co, Johnson, Kramer, Whelan, and Broderbund.
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their significance in the alleged pirate's program, however, will
yield a more clearly defined and ascertainable distinction be-
tween the idea and its expression.1 15
Nevertheless, the clearest place to draw-the-line is not necessarily
the wisest. Rather than sacrifice the effectiveness of copyright law
protection for mere simplicity, a better test is offered by the Whelan
court. The means-ends test which distinguishes idea from expres-
sion by distinguishing ultimate function and purpose from the vari-
able means of accomplishment is a workable approach which
provides a more effective distinction.
Three fundamental contentions are advanced to support the it-
erative test. First, because computer programs are different from
any other subject matter covered by copyright, a different rule is
necessary which only protects against literal copying. The mistaken
assumption is made that "One cannot simply 'approximate' the en-
tire copyrighted computer program and create a similar operative
program without the expenditure of almost the same amount of
time as the original programmer expended." '116 This is a gross over-
statement and, if true, would condone nonliteral copying and the
plaintiffs in cases like Q-Co, Plains, Whelan and Broderbund would
be left without a remedy. The fact is that these cases are occurring
with increasing frequency, perhaps as an indirect response to the
literalist restrictions which many courts place on the substantial
similarity tests. Obviously, nonliteral misappropriation of other's
copyrighted works is also much cheaper and faster than developing
the product from the outset.
The second argument advanced is that the concept of structure
in computer programs is too vague to be useful as a subject of copy-
right protection. 17 The difficulty with this assertion is that the no-
tion of structure in computer programming is very clearly defined
by means of flow charting, prescribed and preferred paths for data
flow, and conventions for "structured programming." Moreover,
the misappropriation of the basic structure of another's program
may involve just as direct a misappropriation of their time, labor,
and creativity as an exact copying of their lines of code.
The third contention is that because progress in the program-
ming field is qualitatively different in requiring the "stepping stone"
115. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the
Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264, 1299 (1984).
116. Id.
117. Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4
COMPUTER L. REP. 189, 194-97 (1985).
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use of others' works, extension of protection for nonliteral elements
will constitute "overprotection" that will stifle innovation in the
software field. This argument fails for a number of reasons. The
assumption is unfounded since it presumes there can be no progress
without the near-literal copying of others' work. The presumption
that these so-called "building blocks" would be sufficiently similar
to the original programs to be infringing is also questionable. More-
over, it begs the question by first assuming that nonliteral copyright
protection would block stepping stone innovation and then invoking
that very assumption as a reason against extending protection
against nonliteral copying.
It is doubtful that extending software protection to nonliteral
elements will have a negative impact. On the contrary, it is likely
that this protection will have a very beneficial impact in encourag-
ing technological progress in software development by rewarding
the innovators with the protection of the right to economically har-
vest the fruits of their labor and creativity free from parasitic com-
petition. Because the arguments supporting the iterative approach
are not persuasive and because there are strong reasons to extend
copyright protection to nonliteral copying, the integrative test
adopts the nonliteral measure of infringement.
B. The Integrative Test Combines Similarity Tests
There are two situations which merit different substantial simi-
larity test approaches. The first type of situation involves copy-
righted subject matter which is itself designed to be directly
perceived by the consumer and calls for an ordinary observer vari-
ant of the integrative test. Where computer program displays are
copyrighted as audiovisual works, the substantial similarity test
which is appropriate is a two-phase test. In the first phase, the
court should apply the audience analytic similarity test as it was
applied in the second step of the Broderbund analysis. The elements
of similarity and difference (literal and nonliteral) in the appearance
of the audiovisual display should be subject to a detailed point-by-
point comparison. If the trier of fact determines that there is sub-
stantial similarity at this level, then the second stage application of
the audience overall similarity test determines whether those simi-
larities and differences enumerated in the first phase would lead the
ordinary consumer to the conclusion that they were substantially
similar.
The second situation calls for the expert variant of the integra-
tive test where the copyrighted subject matter is not intended to be
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directly perceived by the end user, generally where the underlying
computer program is copyrighted as a literary work. Again, a two
phase approach would prove useful. In the first phase, the expert
analytic similarity test should be used to determine whether there is
a literal or near-literal copying by a close examination and enumer-
ation of similarities and differences. Substantial similarity can be
found at this level and the case resolved. If there is no resolution
during the first phase, the second step paraphrase test (using the
expert overall similarity test similar to the test in Whelan) should be
conducted to determine whether there has been a misappropriation
of the organization, sequence or arrangement of the program's
elements.
It is recommended that the traditional two-stage tests of Am-
stein and Krofft be abandoned for application to computer-related
subject matter because they mix the expert (phase I) tests with the
ordinary observer/audience (phase II) tests where the subject mat-
ter in computer cases tends to favor either one perspective or the
other.
C. The Integrative Test Uses Probative Relevant Evidence
The integrative test represents a flexible approach which allows
the introduction of probative and relevant evidence on indirect as-
pects related to the issue of substantial similarity.
First, the integrative test allows the incorporation of probative
indirect evidence. Where the computer program's audiovisual as-
pect is copyrighted and at issue, the application of an expert dissec-
tion test using expert evidence on the similarities and differences in
the underlying program (even if it is not copyrighted) is desirable
for its corroborative or probative value and should be utilized as in
Artic, Kramer, and Broderbund. Where the computer program it-
self is the copyrighted subject matter at issue and where it produces
an audiovisual display intended for an end user, the use of the audi-
ence analytic similarity test to determine similarities and differences
in the computer program's output should be considered as proba-
tive of the substantial similarity of the underlying program as inter-
preted by the court in Whelan. Even similarities in documentation,
manuals or other accompanying materials should be accepted as
probative evidence as stated by the Johnson court.
It should be noted that the audiovisual display and underlying
program are merely two different aspects of the same process. In
Kramer, one party held the copyright on the audiovisual aspect of a
videogame while the other held a copyright on the underlying pro-
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gram. Perhaps where it can be shown that an audiovisual display
and program are directly linked, the copyright first obtained on one
aspect should also cover the other. This approach is supported by
the rationale of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. II,
which recognized that the copyrighting of a written computer pro-
gram extended to its expression in object code on a ROM chip since
it was merely a different aspect of the same computer process.
Second, the integrative test allows the introduction of proba-
tive negative evidence. For instance, evidence relating to the ab-
sence of documentation (as in SAS) or the absence of other evidence
(such as plans, receipts and contracts) which would normally ac-
company the legitimate research and development process of the
computer product is probative of the likelihood of independent in-
vention. Probative negative evidence also includes evidence of lack
of reasonable development time where there is a surprisingly quick
research and development period for the allegedly infringing prod-
uct as compared to the amount of time it took to develop the alleg-
edly infringed computer product.
Evidence of improbable coincidence in program structure and
content is also probative and should be considered. Such evidence
may include the following facts: the programs share similar errors
(as in Artic, Williams Electronics, and Johnson); the particular solu-
tion to a problem is identical under circumstances which would in-
dicate a high level of improbability for such a coincidence; the
alleged copy also contains the same or similar "ghost code" rem-
nants of aborted but unerased programming attempts in the in-
fringed program (as in SAS); or the allegedly infringing program
has features which are more consistent with the plaintiff's version
of the program than with the defendant's, such as specialized key-
board differences (as in Broderbund) or irrelevant program modules
(as in Q-Co).
Finally, the integrative test looks to probative evidence of prob-
able cover-up activities. Such evidence may include unexplained
blank spots where identifying information would be expected; evi-
dence of selective changes in nonfunctional text; and evidence of
scattered bits of code, hastily edited material and superficial modifi-
cation (as in SAS).
IV. CONCLUSION
We have come a long way in technological progress from the
118. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
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time when the Copyright Act was first formulated in 1790. Apply-
ing a set of rules originally designed to protect the literary and artis-
tic creations of authors, composers, and artists presents unique
problems when applied to protect the products of the computer age.
Rules originally tailored to protect aesthetic forms of creative ex-
pression are now being stretched to protect the electronic designs
and logical programming structures devised by engineers.
In addition to this conflict between traditional legal tests and
technological change, the current state of confusion in substantial
similarity tests is due in part to the conflicting policies behind copy-
right law. On one side, there is the protection of an innovator's
creative merit, investment of time, energy, and resources against
misappropriation by others. On the other side, there is the policy of
preventing the monopolization of an entire area through overpro-
tection resulting in the stifling of free competition. Perhaps as an
attempt to encourage free competition, a number of the early com-
puter copyright cases were decided using a rationale which inade-
quately protected a program author's investment of time, money,
effort, and imagination from misappropriation by others. But com-
puter technology is moving into a new era which will require a
greater need for protection of high technology intellectual property
and necessitate the movement of copyright law into a new frontier.
With the rapidly expanding scope of copyright protection from
computer programs to object code on ROM chips, to microcode, to
screen formats, and to nonliteral copying, it becomes even more im-
portant to establish a uniform integrated substantial similarity test
that will protect computer innovations from infringement.
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